MARKEY, J.

Respondent, Frederick A. Herbert, appeals by right the trial court's order naming petitioner, Barbara Ann Williams, the successor beneficiary to William James Herbert's interest in the Theodora Nickels Herbert Trust. We affirm.

Theodora Nickels Herbert created the trust for the benefit of herself and her three children. Upon her death, the trust became irrevocable and the trust estate was divided into equal shares for the benefit of her children — William James Herbert (William), Elizabeth Ellis Sherman, and respondent, the trustee. Article V, § 1 of the trust agreement provides that "[t]he Trustee shall distribute to each child the entire net income from his or her share at least annually." It is undisputed that the children received these income distributions.

The trust agreement also provides in Article V, § 1, in addition to an income distribution, that the trustee "shall distribute to each child all or any part of the principal of his or her share upon the request of such child in writing, except as provided in Section 2." Section 2 of Article V of the trust agreement provides that the property known as the Nickels Arcade shall "not be withdrawn or distributed from the trust without the consent of a majority in interest of the beneficiaries then entitled to the income of the trust." Nevertheless, Article V, § 2 also provides a procedure for the valuation of a "selling beneficiary['s]" interest, through arbitration if necessary, and providing the other beneficiaries the opportunity to purchase the selling beneficiary's "pro rata share of the value," paying for it in "ten (10) equal annual installments with interest at the then prime rate...." It is undisputed that the Nickels Arcade was the only property in the trust and that none of the beneficiaries ever sought to sell their interest in it.

William died on September 9, 2010. Shortly after his death, the petitioner commenced the present action, asserting that she succeeded to William's interest in the trust pursuant to his last will and testament, which named petitioner as the sole recipient of his estate. The trial court agreed and entered an order naming petitioner the successor to William's interest in the trust. Respondent now appeals.

We review the trial court's interpretation of the trust agreement de novo, as a question of law. In re Reisman Estate, 266 Mich.App. 522, 526, 702 N.W.2d 658 (2005). A court must ascertain and give effect to the settlor's intent when resolving a dispute concerning the meaning of a trust. In re Kostin, 278 Mich.App. 47, 53, 748 N.W.2d 583 (2008). The settlor's intent is determined "from the trust document itself, unless there is ambiguity." Id. If a trust document is ambiguous, a court "may consider the circumstances surrounding the creation of the document and the general rules of construction." Id.

The dispute in this case centers on Article V, § 3 of the trust agreement, which provides in relevant part:

Section 3 contains three contingencies under which the trust for the settlor's children will become inoperative: (1) in the event any of the settlor's children do not survive her, (2) in the event any of the settlor's children die before the establishment of the separate trust estate for his or her benefit, or (3) in the event any of the settlor's children die before said trust estate or any part thereof is delivered over to him or her as provided in the trust. If any of these contingencies occurs, the trust for that child becomes inoperative or terminates. The trustee must then deliver the share of property constituting the trust estate to the child's then living issue.

The parties do not dispute that neither of the first two contingencies applies: the decedent survived the settlor, and a trust estate was created for his benefit upon the settlor's death. The dispute centers on the third contingency, which is whether the decedent died "before said trust estate or any part thereof [was] delivered over to him" as provided under the terms of the trust. Petitioner argues, and the trial court agreed, that the trust estate included annual income distributions to the decedent. The trial court concluded that the third contingency did not occur; consequently, the decedent's interest passed according to his will. We agree.

The trust agreement provides that "[t]he Settlor has deposited with the Trustee certain property described in Schedule A.... The said property, together with any other property that may later become subject to this trust, shall constitute the trust estate and shall be held, administered and distributed by the Trustee as provided herein." (Emphasis added.) Thus, the "trust estate" means the property described in Schedule A (which the parties agree includes the trust's interest in the Nickels Arcade, the trust's sole income-producing asset) and any other property that later becomes subject to the trust. It cannot be disputed that income earned by trust assets such as the Nickels Arcade, once received by the trustee, became "subject to" the trust and to distribution according to its terms. Consequently, the trial court did not err by concluding that income earned by the trust assets that became "subject to this trust" was part of the "trust estate." This interpretation of the trust implements its plain terms and is consistent with the current statutory definition of "estate" as being "the property of the ... trust ... as the property is originally constituted and as it exists, throughout administration." MCL 700.1104(b).1 It follows that the trial court also correctly determined that part of the trust estate was "delivered over" to William before he died in the form of annual income distributions as provided by Article V, § 1 of the trust agreement. Hence, the trial court correctly determined that none of the three contingencies in Article V, § 3 of the trust agreement precluded William from devising his vested interest in the trust to petitioner.

The trial court also correctly ruled that no other provision of the trust precluded William from passing his beneficial interest in the trust by testamentary devise. "A vested beneficial interest in a trust may be devised by will." 34 Michigan Law & Practice 2d, Wills & Estate Admin., § 2, citing In re Allen's Estate, 240 Mich. 661, 664, 216 N.W. 446 (1927). "`A vested property interest is one that is capable of becoming possessory immediately upon the expiration of the preceding estate.'" In re Bem Estate, 247 Mich.App. 427, 447, 637 N.W.2d 506 (2001), quoting Hubscher & Son, Inc. v. Storey, 228 Mich.App. 478, 483, 578 N.W.2d 701 (1998); see also In re Childress Trust, 194 Mich.App. 319, 322, 486 N.W.2d 141 (1992). William clearly had a vested interest in both his pro rata share of income and a right to payment of the value of his pro rata share of the principal of the trust. Because William's beneficial interest in the trust was reducible to a "sum in gross," MCL 555.19,2 it was subject to testamentary disposition. In re Allen's Estate, 240 Mich. at 664-665, 216 N.W. 446.

Respondent's argument would have merit only if William's interest in the trust were that of a lifetime income beneficiary. See 34 Michigan Law & Practice 2d, Wills & Estate Admin., § 2, p. 18, citing Quarton v. Barton, 249 Mich. 474, 480, 229 N.W. 465 (1930) (stating that a life estate with remainder in others cannot be disposed of "by will or by a deed operating as a testamentary disposition"). But William enjoyed both the right to an annual income distribution and also to the distribution of his share of the principal of the trust on written request, Article V, § 1, subject only to the right of the other beneficiaries to exercise their right of first refusal to purchase William's interest in the Nickels Arcade. Indeed, the trust provides that the right to withdraw principal could be exercised by "any of the Settlor's children or the successors of any deceased child...." Article V, § 2.

For the same reasons, respondent's argument that William could not devise his beneficial interest in the trust because the trust instrument does not grant him a power of appointment also fails. After his mother's death and the establishment of his separate one-third share of the trust corpus, William enjoyed the right to its income and the present right to the payment in gross of its value. Because William's interest was not a mere life estate, it was unnecessary that the trust instrument grant him a power of appointment. During his lifetime, William could have withdrawn the value of his share of the trust corpus or made a testamentary disposition of his interest, as he did.

Respondent's final contention — that the spendthrift provisions in the trust precluded William from making a testamentary disposition of his beneficial interest in the trust — also fails. Article VI of the trust is a spendthrift provision, which provides:

The first sentence of Article VI has no application to the facts of this case. There was no "conveyance, transfer, assignment or pledge as security for any debt" of the principal or income of the trust. Likewise, there is no creditor claim. "Creditor" means "[o]ne to whom a debt is owed; one who gives credit for money or goods." Black's Law Dictionary (9th ed). Petitioner is not a creditor; she is a "devisee," i.e., "a person designated in a will to receive a devise." MCL 700.1103(m). Consequently, the first sentence of Article VI is inapplicable.

The second sentence of Article VI also has no bearing on William's devise to petitioner of his interest in the trust. There is no claim that the trustee's legal title to the trust assets is affected, nor is there any assertion of a right to a distribution other than as authorized by the trust instrument. The only claim is that petitioner has succeeded to William's beneficial interest in the trust. This sentence of Article VI does not preclude William's devise to petitioner.

The last sentence is the heart of the spendthrift provision, precluding "any attempted sale, anticipation, assignment or pledge of any of the funds or property held in trust or any part thereof, or the income therefrom by the beneficiaries...." Spendthrift provisions in trusts are lawful in Michigan. MCL 700.7502; In re Edgar Estate, 425 Mich. 364, 366, 389 N.W.2d 696 (1986). A spendthrift provision in a trust "restrains both voluntary and involuntary transfer of the trust beneficiary's interest." MCL 700.7502(2). But respondent concedes that there is no Michigan authority holding that a spendthrift trust provision precludes a trust beneficiary with a present interest in both the income and the principal of a trust from making a testamentary disposition of the beneficiary's interest in the trust. Rather, respondent relies on authority from other jurisdictions. In particular, respondent primarily relies on Cowdery v. Northern Trust Co., 321 Ill.App. 243, 53 N.E.2d 43 (1944). Legal authority from other jurisdictions is not binding in Michigan, but we may review and rely on it if we find its reasoning persuasive. Mable Cleary Trust v. Edward-Marlah Muzyl Trust, 262 Mich.App. 485, 494 n. 5, 686 N.W.2d 770 (2004), overruled in part on other grounds Titan Ins. Co. v. Hyten, 491 Mich. 547, 555 n. 4, 817 N.W.2d 562 (2012).

The trial court rejected respondent's argument regarding the spendthrift provision, reasoning:

We agree with the trial court's reasoning. The spendthrift provision was intended to protect beneficiaries from their improvident, spendthrift ways and from creditors that might thereby arise. Respondent does not argue that petitioner is a creditor, and as noted already, a devisee is by definition not a creditor. Any spendthrift ways of a beneficiary end, of course, at his death and so then does the purpose of the spendthrift provision with respect to the deceased beneficiary. Furthermore, the Cowdery court, quoting Scott on Trusts, § 158.1, opined that a lifetime income beneficiary of a spendthrift trust could make a testamentary disposition of accrued trust income:

We hold that the spendthrift provision of the trust in this case was not intended to preclude a beneficiary such as William, who had a present interest in both the income and the principal of the trust, from making a testamentary disposition of his beneficial interest in the trust.

We affirm. We do not retain jurisdiction. Petitioner, as the prevailing party, may tax costs pursuant to MCR 7.219.

JANSEN, P.J., and MARK J. CAVANAGH, J., concurred with MARKEY, J.